Andrea Moro Webpage

This paper presents and estimates a search model of the labor market where jobs are characterized by wages and work-hours exibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is costly to provide for employers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly related to the preference for exibility parameters: the higher the preference for exibility, the wider is the support of the wage distribution at exible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribution at exible and non- exible jobs. Results show that more than one third of women place positive value to exibility, and that reducing the cost of exibility may considerably reduce the gender wage gap.

How well does the pivotal-voter model explain voter participation in small scale elections? This paper explores this question using data from Texas liquor referenda. It first structurally estimates the parameters of a pivotal-voter model using Texas liquor referendum data. It then uses the estimates to evaluate both the within and out-of-sample performance of the model. Results show that the model is capable of predicting turnout in the data fairly well, but tends, on average, to predict electoral outcomes that are closer to what we observe in the data. A comparison with the results obtained from an alternative model with non strategic voters based on expressive voting shows that the alternative model performs better in predicting electoral outcomes.

Slides most recent talk

Since 1914, the U.S. Senate has been elected and incumbent senators allowed to run for reelection without limit. This differs from several other elected offices in the U.S., which impose term limits on incumbents. Term limits may harm the electorate if tenure is beneficial or if they force high quality candidates to retire but may also benefit the electorate if they cause higher quality candidates to run. We investigate how changes in electoral design affect voter utility by specifying and structurally estimating a dynamic model of voter decisions. We find that tenure effects for the U.S. Senate are negative or small and that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. Because of this, term limits can significantly increase voter welfare.

Since 1914, incumbent U.S. senators running for reelection have won almost 80% of the time. We investigate why incumbents win so often. We allow for three potential explanations for the incumbency advantage: selection, tenure, and challenger quality, which are separately identified from histories of election outcomes following an open seat election. We specify a dynamic model of voter behavior that allows for these three effects, and structurally estimate the parameters of the model using U.S. Senate data. We find that tenure effects are negative or small. We also find that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. If incumbents faced challengers as strong as candidates for open seats, the incumbency advantage would be cut in half.

Slides most recent talk : 2004 Senatorial races outcome prediction

I dati mostrano che il modello italiano di diritto allo studio č inefficace. I sussidi sono modesti rispetto al costo della laurea, e difficilmente possono influire sulle decisioni dei giovani provenienti dalle famiglie meno abbienti. Meglio sarebbe introdurre forme di credito agli studi universitari. Che dovrebbero coprire i costi dell'istruzione, ma anche i mancati salari, con rimborsi a lungo termine. Ricordando che i paesi con una alta percentuale di laureati hanno anche un elevato differenziale medio salariale a favore di chi possiede un titolo universitario.

Le tasse universitarie sono aumentate considerevolmente negli ultimi anni. Ma laurearsi rimane un ottimo investimento. Le tasse e i contributi universitari incidono in misura minima sui costi di frequenza. Per chi paga la cifra massima, il rendimento dell'investimento č di circa il 9,5 per cento annuo. E resterebbe alto anche se il contributo medio per studente fosse portato a 5mila euro annui.

Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffred by the losers and show that the informationally efficient of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of over-compensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient.

Slides: 1/2005

A stylized model of trade between identical countries is developed, where the only departure from standard neoclassical theory is that worker skills are imperfectly observable. This creates an informational externality since firms take aggregate investments into consideration when making inference about individual workers. The interaction between the informational externality and price effects generates a force in favor of specialization. Equilibria where comparative advantages in different industries arise endogenously exist even when the autarky model has a unique equilibrium.

External appendix : Slides of most recent talk : A larger paper with the more general theory (12/2000)

Why are trade barriers often used to protect home producers, even at the cost of introducing deadweight losses from higher commodity prices? We add an informational friction to the standard textbook argument in favor of free trade, and show that trade restrictions may be a moreefficient policy than a lump sum transfer to the displaced producers. Trade barriers, while generating deadweight losses, have the benefit that they do not generate a need for compensation. When the policy maker does not know the amount that should be transferred, the risk of over-compensating may make tradebarrier more efficient.

This is an application of a more general policy paper forthcoming in the AER

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize, and discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with "reverse discrimination'' as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.

External appendix : Figures and example mathematica notebook available upon request :
Note: you need permission from the Journal of Economic Theory to download this paper

This paper investigates how lack of information may bias the investigator's assessment of the presence of statistical discrimination. We show that the nature of the bias is such that statistical discrimination may be rejected in a Mincerian regression even when the data is generated from an equilibrium with statistical discrimination. This may occur even when the investigator has a more informative signal of productivity the employers have.

Slides of most recent talk

This paper presents the structural estimation of a statistical discrimination model. Although the model is capable of displaying multiple equilibria, an estimation strategy that identifies both the parameters of the model and the equilibrium chosen by the economic agents is developed and empirically implemented. A comparison between the equilibria that were selected in the economy over time and the other potential equilibria reveals that the decline in wage inequality experienced in the U.S. economy in the last thirty years cannot be attributed to changes in the equilibrium selection.

Omitted computations

We consider a model of endogenous human capital formation with competitively determined wages. In the presence of two distinguishable, but ex ante identical groups of workers, we show that discrimination is sustainable in equilibrium, even if the corresponding model with a single group of workers has a unique equilibrium. An affirmative action policy consisting of a quota may ``fail'' in the sense that there still may be equilibria where groups are treated differently. However, the incentives to invest for agents in the discriminated group are improved by affirmative action if the initial equilibrium is the most discriminatory equilibrium in the model without the policy. The welfare effects are ambiguous. We demonstrate that it is possible that the policy makes the intended beneficiaries worse off: even if the starting point is the most discriminatory equilibrium the expected payoff may decrease for all agents in the target group.

Note: you need permission from the Journal of Public Economics to download this paper