Andrea Moro Webpage

We propose a feasible estimation procedure for a general class of models with social interactions which might display multiple equilibria. We evaluate the efficiency and computational feasibility of different approaches to solving the curse of dimensionality implied by the equilibrium multiplicity and we implement the proposed estimation procedure using Add Health data to understand how group interactions affect teenagers' smoking behavior.

This paper presents and estimates a search model of the labor market where jobs are characterized by wages and work-hours exibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is costly to provide for employers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly related to the preference for exibility parameters: the higher the preference for exibility, the wider is the support of the wage distribution at exible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribution at exible and non- exible jobs. Results show that more than one third of women place positive value to exibility, and that reducing the cost of exibility may considerably reduce the gender wage gap.

This chapter surveys the theoretical literature on statistical discrimination and affirmative action. This literature suggests dierent explanations for the existence and persistence of group inequality. This survey highlights such dierences and describes in these contexts the effects of color-sighted and color-blind armative action policies, and the efficiency implications of discriminatory outcomes

Since 1914, incumbent U.S. senators running for reelection have won almost 80% of the time. We investigate why incumbents win so often. We allow for three potential explanations for the incumbency advantage: selection, tenure, and challenger quality, which are separately identified from histories of election outcomes following an open seat election. We specify a dynamic model of voter behavior that allows for these three effects, and structurally estimate the parameters of the model using U.S. Senate data. We find that tenure effects are negative or small. We also find that incumbents face weaker challengers than candidates running for open seats. If incumbents faced challengers as strong as candidates for open seats, the incumbency advantage would be cut in half.

Slides most recent talk : 2004 Senatorial races outcome prediction

Slides: 1/2005

A stylized model of trade between identical countries is developed, where the only departure from standard neoclassical theory is that worker skills are imperfectly observable. This creates an informational externality since firms take aggregate investments into consideration when making inference about individual workers. The interaction between the informational externality and price effects generates a force in favor of specialization. Equilibria where comparative advantages in different industries arise endogenously exist even when the autarky model has a unique equilibrium.

External appendix : Slides of most recent talk : A larger paper with the more general theory (12/2000)

Why are trade barriers often used to protect home producers, even at the cost of introducing deadweight losses from higher commodity prices? We add an informational friction to the standard textbook argument in favor of free trade, and show that trade restrictions may be a moreefficient policy than a lump sum transfer to the displaced producers. Trade barriers, while generating deadweight losses, have the benefit that they do not generate a need for compensation. When the policy maker does not know the amount that should be transferred, the risk of over-compensating may make tradebarrier more efficient.

This is an application of a more general policy paper forthcoming in the AER